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8 - A New Politics of Desire and Disintegration in Thailand
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- By Chairat Charoensin-O-Larn, Thammasat University
- Edited by Michael J. Montesano, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Aekapol Chongvilaivan
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- Book:
- Bangkok, May 2010
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 18 January 2012, pp 87-96
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Summary
I
For those who are not familiar with the history of modern Thai society and politics, the images of the Thai military's brutal dispersal of the Red Shirt protestors in the heart of Bangkok's business district on 19 May 2010 — resulting in scores dead, nearly 2,000 injured, further scores of missing persons, and general unrest in the city as a consequence of such a disgraceful action — might appear shocking and unthinkable, to say the least. However, May 2010 was not the first time that a civilian government asked the Thai armed forces to suppress the Red Shirt protestors. A similar incident took place a year earlier, in the bloody events of April 2009, when the military also moved in to crush the Red Shirt demonstrators, though with fewer fatalities than during the riots of the following year.
Thailand's armed forces have long been known for their brutal suppression of dissidents, be they communist instigators during the Cold War years, student activists in the 1970s, demonstrators for democracy in the 1990s, or southern separatists and Red Shirts in the most recent period. Furthermore, the military's role in staging countless coups d’état to usurp power from civilian governments represents a hallmark in the historical record of modern Thai politics. What is so different about the most recent rounds of events in Thailand is the changing role and image of the Thai military from yesterday's usurper of power to today's force for stability, a force necessary for the survival of a sitting civilian government. The role of the military in Thai politics has, then, become increasingly sophisticated. The military is now much more effective in accomplishing its aims. These circumstances leave the future of Thai democracy overshadowed by a cloud of doom.
The suppression of the Thai people's desire for democracy, equality, and justice — whether in the form of violent military crackdowns, of legal threats including charges of lèse majesté or involvement in the alleged current “anti-monarchy movement,” or of vigorous and misguided campaigns on behalf of a distorted ideology of national unity — has long been a prominent feature of the activity of Thailand's ruling elites. Violent crackdowns on the Red Shirt demonstrators in April 2009 and May 2010 are just two recent manifestations of an old-style politics of desire.
Thailand in 2009: Unusual Politics Becomes Usual
- from THAILAND
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- By Chairat Charoensin-O-Larn, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2010
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 18 May 2010, pp 303-331
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Summary
On 17 December 2008, a young Democrat Party leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva, was sworn in as Thailand's twenty-seventh Prime Minister and the third Prime Minister within the same year. He inherited a weak economy and a society divided for three years due to the country's unusual political situation. In his speech following the swearing-in ceremony, Abhisit pledged to be “Prime Minister for everybody” and to defend the monarchy as a revered institution. Abhisit won parliamentary support to become Prime Minister by persuading key factions of the now-defunct People's Power Party (PPP) and its minor former coalition parties to switch sides to vote for him. This is alleged to have been made possible through the lobbying of the head of the army, General Anupong Paochinda. Abhisit's swearing, in a way, signaled the end of the era of political domination in Thai politics by Thaksin Shinawatra that had lasted for almost eight years (2001–8).
However, the manner in which Prime Minister Abhisit assumed power also signaled a return to the old nam nao (polluted) type of dirty/money politics typical of Thai politics in general and of the Thaksin regime in particular. Did this mean that Thai politics would return to the same old-fashioned jockeying for position and self-interested bargaining? How could the costly, devastating protests and demonstrations of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) culminate in a return to exactly the same kind of politics against which they had fought with such determination? The rise to power of Abhisit has once again shattered the myth of political activists and moralist crusaders that Thai politics can be easily cleaned up by simply blaming and removing one controversial person from the political scene — the most notable recent example being, of course, the fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin. A new government was installed, yet the same old regime remained intact.
Prime Minister Abhisit came with an abundant supply of political goodwill, notably hope. Hope to return the country to normalcy, hope to restore the economy, hope to uphold the monarchy, and hope to reunite the nation — the same old hopes that the coup of 19 September 2006 had stirred with little fulfilment. A Bangkok Post columnist described the drama of Thai politics of the recent past with these words: “It is like burning the whole house down just to get rid of a few dirty rats”.
4 - Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand
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- By Chairat Charoensin-O-Larn, Thammasat University
- Edited by John Funston
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- Book:
- Divided Over Thaksin
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 17 August 2009, pp 49-79
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Summary
OVERVIEW
Thailand' military coup on the night of 19 September 2006 came as a surprise, and was greeted with resentment by some and with joy, relief, and hope by others. The former were afraid that the coup was just the beginning of yet another military intervention in Thai politics, a tradition that represents a bitter revival of events fifteen years before in the 1991 coup and bloody incident of May 1992. Representatives of this group ranged from a number of students and university lecturers who called themselves the “19 September Network against the Coup”, to a taxi driver who ran his car head-on into an army tank stationed at the Royal Plaza to show his discontent with the coup for destroying Thailand' democracy.
For educated people within this group, using the military coup as a means to restore democracy was simply indefensible. Low-income people (including taxi drivers), on the other hand, were benefiting greatly from a number of generous financial schemes emanating from the populist policies designed and implemented by Prime Minister Thaksin after he came to office in 2001. These schemes included universal healthcare, village investment funds, the People' Bank, and cheap loans. The departure of Thaksin from power has meant the loss of many of these benefits.
However, in mentioning this, I do not mean to argue that these low-income groups, particularly the rural masses, are the “victims” of Thaksin' populist policies, as most middle class and urban intellectuals have been fond of pointing out. On the contrary, the victim thesis overlooks the significant fact that the rural poor have persistently struggled throughout
Thai history to bring political pressure to bear on various governments. The populist policies of Thaksin are in part the result of this long and arduous struggle.
Against the background of military intervention in Thai politics, the recent coup is thus seen by this group as redemption for the army, which is now in a position to reclaim its former prominent role in Thai politics after a long hiatus. The picture will become clearer after 30 September 2007 when General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, chairman of the Council for National Security (CNS) and leader of both the coup and the former Council of Democratic Reform (CDR), retires from his army post. Meanwhile, General Sonthi has kept the Thai public guessing whether or not he will enter politics, and if so by what means.